Abstract-As the use of wireless technologies increases significantly due to ease of deployment, cost-effectiveness and the increase in bandwidth, there is a critical need to make the wireless communications secure, and resilient to attacks or faults (malicious or natural). Wireless communications are inherently prone to cyberattacks due to the open access to the medium. While current wireless protocols have addressed the privacy issues, they have failed to provide effective solutions against denial of service attacks, session hijacking and jamming attacks.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications become the most widely deployed network technology because of their ease of deployment, inexpensive and the continues increase in their bandwidth. However, as the use of wireless technology increases, they become more attractive for cyberattacks. Current wireless protocols have addressed the privacy issues, but have failed to provide effective solutions against cyber attacks such as denial of service attacks, session hijacking and the jamming attacks. In this paper, we present a resilient wireless communication approach to achieve highly dependable, and resilient wireless networks and services.
Our resilient approach is based on Moving Target Defense (MTD) paradigm that aims at deploying mechanisms that are diverse [7] [10] , and change randomly to severely limit the exposure of existing vulnerabilities and the opportunities to launch successful attacks. For example, in radio frequency communications, we can change dynamically and randomly the radio parameters such as the modulation scheme, the operating frequency, the packet size, and the network address in order to achieve resilient wireless communications. Our approach utilizes the programmability of the Software Defined Radio (SDR) to implement the MTD algorithm [1] . We use two radio channels, of which one is an active channel, and the second is a standby channel. The standby channel is used when an attack succeeds in damaging the active radio channel.
In our evaluation of the resilient methodology, we focus on radio jamming attacks, and present solutions to tolerate these type of attacks. The radio jamming attack is a type of Denial of Service Attack (DoS) during which the jammer continuously transmits a signal that prevents users from using the services they need [5] . This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the approach. Section 4 discusses in further detail our implementation approach. In section 5, we conclude the paper and discuss our future research direction.
II. RELATED WORK

A. Security of Wireless Networks and Protecting Methods
The most difficult attack type against wireless communications is jamming attack that can be launched by following several scenarios [2] : 1) The first scenario involves scanning the traffic to detect the Start of Frame Delimiter (SFD), and then it attempts to jam the packet when any SFD is detected. To defend against such an attack, the sender should agree with the receiver to use pseudo numbers to generate the SFD; 2) In the second scenario, the jammer scans the radio channel periodically and if any signal strength is detected, the jammer attacks that channel. To defend against this attack, the sender uses a frequency hopping; which means changing the operating frequency associated with each period; 3) In this scenario, the jammer scans all the channels as fast as possible in order to determine the active channel and then launch the jamming attack. To defend against this attack scenario, the sender can partition the payload into small packets to prevent the attack from having enough time to detect the period used to transmit the packet.; and 4) In the last attack scenario, the jammer sends pulses on a single channel trying to affect on any message transmitted on this channel. To defend against this scenario, the sender encodes each packet.
The RTS fake jamming attack is another attack type in which the attacker senses the channel, if the channel is idle then the attacker sends a fake RTS to reserve the bandwidth, and the access point responds with CTS [5] . In this method, the attacker prevents other users from sending data for the duration specified by the CTS, and that creates a denial of service attack. This attack can be stopped by having the access point monitor the channel, and if it finds the channel idle, then it drops the CTS [5] .
B. Moving Target Defense (MTD)
The MTD goal is to "Create, evaluate and deploy mechanisms and strategies that are diverse, continually shift, and change over time to increase complexity and costs for attackers, limit the exposure of vulnerabilities and opportunities for attack, and increase system resiliency" [34] . The concept of MTD can be applied at any level of the system design hierarchy, from the network level up to the application level. At the network level, one can randomly change the IP address as in IP fluxing [12] . In this approach, two IP addresses are used: a real IP address (RIP) and a virtual IP address (VIP). The attackers cannot identify the source of the packet because it uses the VIP. The VIP is used throughout the network until the packet reaches its destination network and only then the destination host translates the VIP into the RIP.
At the application level, the MTD aims at changing the execution environment used to run each application [21, 22] . In this approach, replication, diversity and random shuffling techniques are used to change the application execution environment, in which different application versions are used (each version can use a different programming language and/or different operating system), and use redundant physical computing and network resources.
One can generalize the MTD approach to develop resilient smart city services [23] . At this level, the resilient methodology utilizes two main components: Resilient Communications Services, and Resilient Command and Control Applications. In this approach, all the communications and computations resources involved in delivering the city services will be randomly changed to make it extremely difficult for attackers to figure out the resources used to deliver the smart city services and consequently evade cyberattacks.
C. Resilient Networks
The resilient approach is a promising approach to mitigate attacks, since the current cybersecurity solutions have failed to secure and protect network operations and services. Developing programmable networks can be leveraged to develop resilient networks [15] . The network programmability property provides the network with the freedom to adopt its behavior based on the current network conditions in order to tolerate detected network attacks and maintain its quality of service requirements. In [15] the researchers achieve the required resiliency by using programmable networks to detect and mitigate the malicious flash crowd attack. The detection mechanism is based on comparing the response traffic volume with the expected value. If the extracted values are beyond the normal threshold, then an attack occurrence is declared. After the attack is declared, the mitigation attack starts using one of the following two solutions: 1) Dropping the malicious packets at the attacker's router, and 2) Changing the route of the packets and distributing the packets among existing routers.
The introduction of Software Defined Networking (SDN) lead to the development of highly secure and resilient network services. Some researchers used the SDN strategy to mitigate DDOS attacks [28] .
Other researchers addressed resiliency in wireless networks [3] by using a pair wise key, which could be implemented by three steps: initialization, direct key setup, and path key setup. In this approach, the security requirements for wireless networks defined in terms of the following properties: confidentiality, authentication, and integrity. On the other hand, the survivability requirements for wireless networks defined in terms of the following properties: reliability, availability, and energy efficiency.
Channel hopping is another technique proposed to develop a resilient wireless network [16] . The resilience capability of this approach depends on the frequency of the channel, hoping rate, and its randomness. The hopping time affect performance and resiliency of the wireless network. It shouldn't be set to a very small value with respect to configuration time. In this case, the network will be continuously changing without doing any useful work that will result in self-injecting DoS attack. On the other hand, it should not be set too long to avoid giving the attacker enough time to discover existing vulnerability and launch successful attacks.
Another approach to achieve resiliency is based on using multiple redundant and diversified routes in order to tolerate attacks in case on route is being compromised [32] .
D. Software Defined Radio
Software Defined Radio (SDR) is becoming important because it allows different radio communication protocols and signal process mechanisms to be implemented in software rather than being implemented in hardware [24] . The functions that can be programmed in SDR include Analog-Digital Conversion and Digital-Analog Conversion (ADC/DAC) and the configuration of the digital signal processor.
Most of the previous work has been focused on leveraging the SDR programmability to improve radio spectrum usage and efficiency [18, 24, 29, 30] . In cognitive radio, one can use SDR to improve the quality of service for secondary users by analyzing the characteristics of each band and choosing the one that improves user QoS [18] . In our research, we take a complimentary approach by using the SDR programmability to design resilient radio communications that can continue to operate normally in spite of being attacked.
III. RESILIENT WIRELESS COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE
Our approach to achieve resilient wireless communications is based on moving target defense technique [7] [4] [21] . The approach involves using SDR functions to change the properties of the communication links between two nodes at random. This will make it extremely difficult for an attacker to succeed in attacking our wireless communication. Figure 1 explains our approach. If the communication link properties do not change as it is normally the case, the attacker will have enough time to probe the communication channel, identify its vulnerability and then launch an attack as shown in the successful attack scenario in Figure 1 . However, if the communication link properties change frequently with a shorter interval than the time for the attacker to probe, construct and launch an attack, the attack will not be successful. Our methodology exploits the programmability of the SDR technology to randomly change the communication link properties such that attacks become ineffective in disrupting the wireless communications.
To apply the MTD approach to radio communications, we exploited the reconfigurability property of the SDR to change the properties of the communication links between two nodes at random as shown in Figure 2 .
The MTD module configures the transmitter and receiver modules so they can operate at different frequencies, modulation and packet length that can also be changed randomly to avoid being discovered and thus avoid attacks [8] [12] . In addition to using diversified radio links, we use two redundant radio links (one is designated as the primary link and the second one as the standby link) [2] . If an attack affects the active radio channel, the system will use the data delivered through the standby channel and consequently tolerate the attack. Figure 3 shows an example on how to deploy our approach in a military tactical environment. In this example, for each link, we use two diversified radios links with respect to the type of modulation used, signal frequency, and packet size. The active channel for Link 1 uses QPSK modulation, 2 GHz frequency and 20 byte packet size, while its standby link utilizes BPSK modulation, 1 GHz frequency and 30 byte packet size. In this configuration, if the active link is attacked (red block), the system will tolerate this attack by using the data provided by the standby channel (blue block), and consequently tolerates this attack Figure 4 gives a detailed architecture and its operations that follow the algorithm shown in Figure 5 . At the beginning, our system initiates a setup message that contains a key to define the configuration and the reconfiguration time (Tc). To avoid being detected, it uses the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm (steps 1 to 3) [9] [12] [3] [13] . Each end-user defines the configuration to be used and its duration to start the communication process (steps 4 to 7).
At the transmitter side, each message is sent through two links (the active link and the standby link), and each link has different configurations (steps 8 to 15). At the receiver side, the receiver starts receiving and decoding the data over the active and standby channels (steps 16 to 21).
IV. IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH
In this section, we describe our test bed which contains the transmitter, the receiver, and the MTD module that will use SDR to randomly change the configuration at the runtime [1] [10] .
A. Software Defined Radio
The SDR is a reconfigurable radio that uses software approach (using FPGA's) to change its operational parameters. The SDR consists of a mixer to convert the signal from the radio 
frequency (RF) to the intermediate frequency (IF) if the SDR is
configured to work in the Rx mode, or to convert the signal from the IF mode to the RF mode if the SDR is setup to work in the Tx mode. It also consists of an analog to digital converter and a digital to analog converter, and a DSP or FPGA to perform the signal processing commands that are generated from the SDR software [11] [24] . The most widely used SDR software environment is GNU-Radio toolkit [1] [6] . The GNU Radio is an open source software used to implement SDR algorithms. It provides tools for signal processing, and it supports two programming languages: Python, and C++. To implement our resilient communication approach, we developed an MTD algorithm to randomly change the parameters of the GNU Radio modules as will be explained in the next section.
In our test bed, we used two SDRs one as a transmitter, and one as a receiver. At the transmitter side, we developed a configuration program using Python language and GNU Radio modules. This program enables the user to automatically change the configuration for each communication cycle as shown in Table I . Table I is used to specify the configurations being used in the transmission process. Figures 6, and 7 show the block diagram of the transmitter and the receiver. At the receiver side, the same configuration table is used to configure the link after random intervals of time.
As discussed before, the resilient algorithm changes the configurations and the shuffling rate (reconfiguration time) automatically based on two parameters: 1) the key value; and 2) the iteration number.
1)The key exchange uses the Diffie-Hellman algorithm to prevent eavesdropping and maintain key confidentiality [33] . 2) Configuration (i) denotes the configuration type (frequency, packet length and configuration time) to be adopted at each iteration. For example, after computing the key on both sides, they start the communication process using the configuration and the reconfiguration time that can be determined using the following two Equations: Equation (1) defines the configuration to be used, and equation (2) defines the reconfiguration time. It is clear from Equation 2 that the configuration time will be changed based on the key value and iteration number (i).
The performance and overhead of our resilient approach in term of execution time is shown in Table II . In our approach, the overhead is the result of the key exchange, and the random changes in the configuration of the communication links. In our experimental results, we show that our algorithm can tolerate any attack against one of the communication links because of the availability of other redundant and diversified link that will not be impacted by the attack as shown in Figure 9 .
B. Jamming Attack
In our test bed, we have demonstrated experimentally the feasibility of our approach to tolerate several attack scenarios. We launched a jamming attack by using one SDR unit that is programmed to produce a jamming attack that transmits a jamming signal using the same properties of the transmitting channel to prevent receiving the transmitted data correctly. In our test bed, the attacker sent a continuous signal on channel 3 at 90 MHz frequency (see Table I ) and using GFSK modulation. By using the same configuration of the transmitting channel, the jamming signal interfered with the transmitted signal and consequently corrupt the data being transmitted on the active channel. However, the communication will be carried out correctly because the standby link is not affected by this jamming attack because it is operating at different configuration.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented a resilient wireless communications architecture based on moving target defense and software defined radio (SDR) techiques. The wireless communication links use SDR in order to dynamically program the radio channels such that we have any communication interval two diversified and redundant wireless communications links: one primary (active) and the second one is a standby link that will be used in case the primary link was successfully attacked. The configuration of each link will be changed randomly after each reconfiguration time. The link configuration defines the wireless communication properties such as the link frequency, modulation type, and packet size. We have validated the resilience of our approach experimentally. Our evaluation showed that the presented resilient wireless communication methodology can tolerate a wide range of wireless attacks including jamming attacks Furthermore, by properly setting the reconfiguration time, shuffling change rate, we can drive the probability of successful attack to be close to zero. Our future work is to quantify the attack successful probability and determine the shuffling rate that can bring this probability to close to zero.
